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Abstract 
 
Strategies for trade liberalization when the rates of time preference are heterogeneous 
across countries are examined in the framework of endogenous growth. The paper 
argues that the best strategy for a country with the relatively higher rate of time 
preference is the strategy of free trade with wielding market power if the country is 
large enough to wield market power because all the optimality conditions are satisfied 
in this case. By this strategy, the current account of the country shows persisting 
surpluses, which implies a possibility that China has taken this strategy. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 The trade liberalization in developing countries has been actively studied in the 
last several decades. It has been argued that trade liberalization promotes growth 
because openness raises the steady state level of income. Many empirical studies 
support this argument although there are many econometric difficulties to establish an 
empirical link between trade liberalization and economic performance. Winters (2004) 
concludes, after surveying the recent literature on this issue (e.g. Easterly and 
Levine,2001; Dollar and Kraay, 2004), that the weight of evidence is quite clearly in the 
direction that openness enhances growth. However, the actual processes of growth 
through trade liberalization do not seem so clear-cut. For example, if preferences of 
households are heterogeneous across countries, the link between trade liberalization and 
economic performance is not so simple as the case of the identical preferences across 
countries. Owing to some disturbing factors, the actual processes of growth initiated by 
trade liberalization may not proceed on a straight course but be amalgamation of 
complex processes. This paper studies these complex processes of growth initiated by 
trade liberalization, and directs its attention to heterogeneity in the rate of time 
preference rate in the framework of endogenous growth.  
 It has been argued that people in poor countries have the higher rate of time 
preference. Importance of this factor is stressed particularly in the literature of 
environmental economics. Lawrance (1991) concludes that time preference rates have a 
strong negative correlation with labor income. Cuesta et al. (1997) concludes that there 
is some evidence of declining discount rates with increasing income based on empirical 
research in Costa Rica and a review of 14 other empirical studies.1 Mink (1993) 
suggests that an inherently short time-horizon of the poor produces environmental 
degradation. The notion that the poor has the higher rate of time preference is implicitly 
argued in the broader literature of sustainable development (e.g. World Bank, 1992). 
This paper commences its analysis starting from the fact that people in poor countries 
have the higher rate of time preference, but does not examine why the poor has the 
higher rate of time preference. The paper merely examines theoretical consequences of 
trade liberalization when the rates of time preference are heterogeneous across countries 
based on an endogenous growth model.  
 Becker (1980) argues that the heterogeneous rate of time preference results in 
an unfavorable consequence for relatively more impatient households because the whole 
capital is eventually owned only by the most patient household. Similar consequences 
may be observed between heterogeneous countries. However, the model in this paper 
predicts different consequences. Firstly, if a relatively more impatient country is large 
enough and can wield market power, the best strategy for it is the strategy of free trade 
with wielding market power, because only this strategy can satisfy all the optimality 
conditions. With this strategy, the balance on current account of the relatively more 
impatient country shows persisting surpluses while it owning all its capitals. This 
strategy may provide insights into the recent trade behavior of China whose economy 
clearly appears to be large enough to wield market power. The large bilateral current 
                                                          
1 The arguments over the reason why the poor has the higher rate of time preference are inconclusive. 
Pender (1996) concludes that credit constraints are the main reason. Some economists argue that they 
have the higher rates of time preference because they are poor.   
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account deficit of the U.S. with China has been persisting. The model in the paper 
predicts that the current account deficit of the U.S. with China will be observed if the 
rate of time preference in China is relatively higher than that in the U.S. and if China is 
wielding market power. Secondly, when a relatively more impatient country is not large 
enough and cannot wield market power, no strategy can achieve optimality. 
Nevertheless, if many small countries with similar preferences can cooperate with each 
other and integrate their economies, and if they can wield a combined market power that 
is strong enough like a large country, they can also choose the strategy of free trade with 
wielding market power, and thus all their optimality conditions are satisfied. 
 The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a two-country endogenous 
growth model in which international transactions and heterogeneous time preference 
rates are incorporated is constructed. In Section 3, the basic nature of the model is 
examined. In Section 4, three strategies for a relatively more impatient country (the 
strategy of free trade without wielding market power, the strategy of trade protection, 
and the strategy of free trade with wielding market power) are examined. In Section 5, 
the three strategies are compared with regard to optimality, the level of output, long-run 
growth rates, and the balance on current account, and the best strategy for the country is 
examined. Finally some concluding remarks are offered in Section 6. 
 
2.  THE MODEL 
 
2.1  The base model 
 In most endogenous growth models, 
t
t
k
A  is kept constant by some mechanisms 
that are different according to the type of models, and the growth rate of consumption is 
commonly expressed as 
( )
ε
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k
A
α
c
c t
α
t
t
t
t
−−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
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⎛−
=
1
&  where ct, kt, At and nt are consumption 
per capita, capital per capita, technology and the growth rate of population in period t 
respectively, and θ is the rate of time preference, ε is the degree of relative risk aversion, 
and α is a constant (e.g. Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1998; Jones, 2003). Thus, in 
most of the models, the rate of time preference plays a crucial role for growth rates. In 
this sense, most of the endogenous growth models may be used for the analysis in this 
paper if international transactions are incorporated in them. However, at the same time, 
they commonly have the problems of scale effects and/or the influence of population 
growth (e.g., Jones, 1995a, b). Hence, this paper specifically uses the model shown in 
Harashima (2004) that is free from both problems (see also e.g. Jones, 1995a; Aghion 
and Howitt, 1998; Peretto and Smulders, 2002; Harashima, 2005).. 
 Let Yt, Ct, Kt, Lt and At be outputs, consumption, capital inputs, labor inputs and 
technology in period t respectively. The production function is ( )tttt LKAFY ,,= . The 
accumulation of capital is 
 
ttttt δKAνCYK −−−= &&                            (1) 
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where δ  is the rate of depreciation, ( )0>ν  is a constant, and a unit of Kt and 
ν
1  of a 
unit of At are equivalent, i.e., they are produced using the same quantities of inputs. 
Every firm is identical and has the same size, and for any period,  
 
t
ρ
t
L
Mm =                               (2) 
 
where Mt is the number of firms and m and ( )1>ρ  are constants. In addition, the 
relation  
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∂ −                           (3) 
 
and thus  
 
( )
t
t
t
t
A
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k
y
∂
∂=∂
∂ −1                            (4) 
 
is always kept where yt, is output per capita in period t. Equation (2) indicates that the 
number of population and the number of firms in an economy are positively related. 
Equations (3) and (4) indicate that returns on investing in Kt and investing in At for a 
firm are kept equal, and also that a firm that invents a new technology cannot obtain all 
the returns on investing in At. This means that investing in At increases Yt but returns of 
an individual firm that invests in At is only a fraction of the increase of Yt such that 
( ) ( ) ( )t
t
t
t
tρ
t νA
YmL
νA
YM ∂
∂=∂
∂ −− 1 . The reason is uncompensated knowledge spillovers to other 
firms.   
 Broadly speaking, there are two types of uncompensated knowledge spillovers: 
the first is the intra-sectoral knowledge spillover, i.e. MAR externalities, and the second 
is the inter-sectoral knowledge spillover, i.e. Jacobs externalities. The theory of MAR 
assumes that knowledge spillovers between homogenous firms work out most 
effectively and thus spillovers primarily emerge within one sector. As a result, 
uncompensated knowledge spillovers will be more active if the number of firms within 
one sector is larger. On the other hand, Jacobs (1969) argues that knowledge spillovers 
are most effective among firms that practice different activities, and thus diversification, 
i.e. variety of sectors, is important for spillovers. As a result, uncompensated knowledge 
spillovers will be more active if the number of sectors is larger in an economy. 
 If it is assumed that all the sectors have the same number of firms, an increase 
of the number of firms in an economy results in more active knowledge spillovers 
owing to either MAR externalities or Jacobs externalities. That is, if an increase of the 
number of firms in an economy is a result of an increase of the number of firms in each 
sector, uncompensated knowledge spillovers will become more active by MAR 
externalities, and if an increase of the number of firms in an economy is a result of an 
increase of the number of sectors, uncompensated knowledge spillovers will become 
more active by Jacobs externalities. In either case, an increase of the number of firms in 
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an economy leads to more active uncompensated knowledge spillovers. 
 Furthermore more active uncompensated knowledge spillovers will reduce the 
returns of a firm that invests in At. 
t
t
A
Y
∂
∂  indicates the over all increase in Yt in an 
economy by an additional At, that consists of both increase in production in the firm that 
invented the new technology and increase in production in other firms that use the 
newly invented technology that the firms obtained either compensating for it to the firm 
or by uncompensated knowledge spillovers. If the number of firms becomes larger and 
thus uncompensated knowledge spillovers becomes more active, the compensated 
fraction in 
t
t
A
Y
∂
∂  that the firm can obtain will become smaller and thus the returns of the 
firm will become also smaller. Equations (3) and (4)) simply describes this mechanism. 
 The production function is specified as ( )ttαtt ,LKfAY = , where ( )10 << αα  is a 
constant. Let 
t
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&= , and assume that ( )tt LKf ,  is 
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tt f
f
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⎞⎜⎝
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 and ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
′
′′−= 21 f
ffk
mν
αA tt && .  
 
2.2  Endogenous growth model in open economies 
 Suppose that there are only two countries in the world: country 1 and country 2. 
In both countries, the values of parameters as well as population are identical except the 
rate of time preference, and the growth rate of population is zero, i.e., 0=tn . The time 
preference rate of the representative household in country 1 is 1θ  and that in country 2 
is 2θ , and 21 θθ < . Goods and services and capitals are freely traded but labor is 
immobilized in each country. The balance on current account in country 1 is tτ  and the 
balance on current account in country 2 is tτ− . The production function in country 1 is ( )tαtt kfAy ,1,1 = , and that in country 2 is ( )tαtt kfAy ,2,2 =  where yi,t and ki,t are output 
and capital per capita in country i in period t for i = 1, 2. The number of population is 
equally 
2
tL  in both countries and thus the total number of population in the world is Lt. 
The number of firms in both countries is Mt and firms operate in both countries. 
Because a balanced growth path requires Harrod neutral technological progress, the 
production functions are specified as αi,tαti,t kAy −= 1  and thus ( ) ( )2,11,, == − iLAKY αttαtiti .2 
     Because both countries are free open economies, returns on investments in both 
countries are kept equal through international arbitration such that  
 
                                                          
2 As is well known, only Harrod neutral technological progress matches the stylized facts presented by 
Kaldor (1961). 
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That is, an increase in At enhances outputs in both countries such that ( )
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equation (5) is always held through international arbitration, equations tt kk ,2,1 = , 
tt kk ,2,1 && = , tt yy ,2,1 = and tt yy ,2,1 && =  are also held. In addition, because ( )
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 The accumulated current account balance dsτ
t
s∫0  mirrors international capital 
flows owing to current account imbalances. That is, the country with current account 
surpluses invests them in the other country. Since ⎟⎟⎠
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balance on goods and services of country 1, and t
t
s
t
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,1  is the balance 
on goods and services of country 2. Because the balance on current account mirrors 
international capital flows, then it is a function of capitals in both countries such that ( ),t,tt ,kkgτ 21= .  
 The representative household in country 1 maximizes the expected utility 
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and the representative household in country 2 maximizes the expected utility 
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where ui,t, ci,t tiA ,& are the utility function, consumption and the increase of At by R&D 
activities in country i in period t for i = 1, 2, ttt AAA ,2,1 &&& += , and E is the expectation 
operator. Equations (6) and (7) implicitly assume that at t = 0 each country does not 
have any foreign asset. 
 
3.  THE BASIC NATURE OF THE MODEL 
 
3.1  The growth rate of consumption 
 Because the production function is Harrod neutral such that αi,tαti,t kAy −= 1  
and thus ( )αttαi,ti,t LAKY −= 1 , and because ( )( ) ( )( )ttttt kfmν
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Since the problem of scale effects in endogenous growth models is not a focal point in 
this paper, tL  is assumed to be sufficiently large for simplicity and thus ( )
( ) 11
1 =+−
−
ααmL
αmL
t
t  is satisfied hereafter in this paper.  
 Therefore, the optimization problem of country 1 can be rewritten as  
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Let Hamiltonian H1 be 
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where tλ1  is a costate variable, thus the optimality conditions for country 1 are  
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Similarly, let Hamiltonian H2 be 
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where tλ2 is a costate variable, thus the optimality conditions for country 2 are  
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Hence, by equations (8), (9) and (10), the growth rate of consumption in country 1 is 
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and, by equations (12), (13) and (14), the growth rate of consumption in country 2 is 
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is satisfied. This possibility is examined in the following sections. 
 
3.2  Transversality condition 
 Transversality conditions are satisfied if the following conditions are satisfied. 
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,1
,1 −<
∞→
t
t
t λ
λ& , 1lim
,2
,2 −<
∞→
t
t
t λ
λ& , 1lim
,1
,1 −<
∞→
t
t
t k
k& , or 1lim
,2
,2 −<
∞→
t
t
t k
k& , the 
transversality conditions (equations (11) and (15)) are satisfied if 
( ) 01lim
,1
,1
,1
0
,1
01
,1,1
<
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
−∂
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛∂
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −∂
∂ ∫∫−
∞→
t
t
t
t
s
t
t
s
α
α
t
t
t
t
t k
c
k
dsτ
k
dsτ
δα
mν
α
k
τ
k
τ  and 
( ) 01lim
,2
,2
,2
0
,2
01
,2,2
<
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
∂
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛∂
−
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂− ∫∫−∞→
t
t
t
t
s
t
t
sα
α
t
t
t
t
t k
c
k
dsτ
k
dsτ
δα
mν
α
k
τ
k
τ .  
Proof: ( ) ( )
,t
,tt
,t
t
sα
α
α
α
,t
,t
k
cτ
k
dsτ
δα
mν
α
δα
mν
α
k
k
1
1
1
01
1
1 11
+−
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= ∫−−&  by equation 
(10). On the other hand, ( ) ( )
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
∂
∂−∂
∂
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−= ∫−−
t
t
t
t
sα
α
α
α
,t
,t
k
τ
k
dsτ
δα
mν
α
δα
mν
α
λ
λ
,1,1
01
1
1 11
&
 
by equation (9). Here, 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +∞→
t
t
t
t
t k
k
λ
λ
1
1
1
1lim
&& ( ) ( )
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
∂
∂−∂
∂
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−= ∫−−∞→
t
t
t
t
sα
α
α
α
t k
τ
k
dsτ
δα
mν
α
δα
mν
α
,1,1
0111lim  
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( ) ( )
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧ +−
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+ ∫−−∞→
,t
,tt
,t
t
sα
α
α
α
t k
cτ
k
dsτ
δα
mν
α
δα
mν
α
1
1
1
0111lim  
( )
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
−∂
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛∂
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −∂
∂= ∫∫−∞→
t
t
t
t
s
t
t
s
α
α
t
t
t
t
t k
c
k
dsτ
k
dsτ
δα
mν
α
k
τ
k
τ
,1
,1
,1
0
,1
01
,1,1
1lim . Therefore, unless 
1lim
,1
,1 −<∞→
t
t
t λ
λ& , 1lim
,2
,2 −≥∞→
t
t
t λ
λ& , 1lim
,1
,1 −<∞→
t
t
t k
k& , or 1lim
,2
,2 −<∞→
t
t
t k
k& , then 0
,1
,1
,1
,1 <+
t
t
t
t
k
k
λ
λ &&  if 
( ) 01lim
,1
,1
,1
0
,1
01
,1,1
<
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
−∂
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛∂
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −∂
∂ ∫∫−
∞→
t
t
t
t
s
t
t
s
α
α
t
t
t
t
t k
c
k
dsτ
k
dsτ
δα
mν
α
k
τ
k
τ . Similarly, 
0lim
2
2
2
2 <⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +∞→
,t
,t
,t
,t
t k
k
λ
λ &&  if ( ) 01lim
,2
,2
,2
0
,2
01
,2,2
<
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
∂
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛∂
−
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂− ∫∫−∞→
t
t
t
t
s
t
t
sα
α
t
t
t
t
t k
c
k
dsτ
k
dsτ
δα
mν
α
k
τ
k
τ . 
                                                                    ■ 
 
Lemma 1 indicates that if τt is not significantly large compared with c1,t and c2,t, the 
transversality conditions are satisfied. Note that the case of 1lim
,1
,1 −<∞→
t
t
t λ
λ& , 1lim
,2
,2 −<∞→
t
t
t λ
λ& , 
1lim
,1
,1 −<
∞→
t
t
t k
k& , or 1lim
,2
,2 −<
∞→
t
t
t k
k&  is extremely unusual and thus these cases are excluded 
hereafter in this paper.  
 
3.3  Growth path 
 Balanced growth is the focal point for the analysis of growth path. Therefore, 
the following analyses focus on the steady state such that 
t
t
t c
c
,1
,1lim
&
∞→
, 
t
t
t c
c
,2
,2lim
&
∞→
, 
t
t
t k
k
,1
,1lim
&
∞→
, 
t
t
t k
k
,2
,2lim
&
∞→
 and 
t
t
t τ
τ&
∞→lim
 are constants. Using Lemma 1, the following important nature of 
the model is proved.  
 
Lemma 2: If == ∞→∞→
t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1 limlim
&& constant, then ==== ∞→∞→∞→∞→
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t k
k
k
k
c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1
,2
,2
,1
,1 limlimlimlim
&&&&   
∫
∫ ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛
= ∞→∞→ t
s
t
s
t
t
t
t ds
dt
dsd
0
0
limlim τ
τ
τ
τ& . 
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Proof: ( ) ( )
t
tt
t
t
t
s
t
α
α
α
α
t
t
t k
cτ
k
dsτ
δα
mν
α
δα
mν
α
k
k
,1
,1
,1
01
,1
,1 limlim11lim
+−
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= ∞→∞→
−−
∞→
∫&  and 
( ) ( )
t
tt
t
t
t
s
t
α
α
α
α
t
t
t k
cτ
k
dsτ
δα
mν
α
δα
mν
α
k
k
,2
,2
,2
01
,2
,2 limlim11lim
−+
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= ∞→∞→
−−
∞→
∫&  by equations (10) and 
(14). By equations (6) and (7), ( )
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −∂
∂=− ∫∫ − tt sα
α
t
t
s
,t
,t
,t,t τdsταmν
α
τdsτ
k
y
cc
0
1
0
1
1
21 122  
because 
t
t
t
t
k
y
k
y
,2
,2
,1
,1
∂
∂=∂
∂ , tt kk ,2,1 = , tt yy ,2,1 = , tt AA ,2,1 && =  and ( ) α
α
ti
ti α
m ν
α
k
y −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=∂
∂ 1
,
, 1   
for 2,1=i . Hence, if ==
∞→∞→
t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1 limlim
&& constant, then 
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t k
k
c
c
c
c
,1
,1
,2
,2
,1
,1 limlimlim
&&&
∞→∞→∞→ ==  
∫
∫ ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛
=== ∞→∞→∞→ t
s
t
s
t
t
t
t
t
t
t ds
dt
dsd
k
k
0
0
,2
,2 limlimlim τ
τ
τ
τ&& .                                      ■ 
 
Lemma 3: If and only if == ∞→∞→
t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1 limlim
&& constant, all the optimality conditions are 
satisfied at the steady state. 
Proof: By Lemma 2, if == ∞→∞→
t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1 limlim
&& constant, then Ξ
k
τ
k
τ
t
t
t
t
t
t
== ∞→∞→
,2,1
limlim  where Ξ 
is a constant. In addition, because 
t
t
tt
s
t
tt
s
t
s
t c
c
dsds
dt
dsd
,1
,1
00
0
limlimlim
&
∞→∞→∞→ ==
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
∫∫
∫
τ
τ
τ
τ
, then 
t
t
s
t k
ds
,1
0lim
∫
∞→
τ
 
1
,1
,1
,2
0 limlim
−
∞→∞→ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛== ∫
t
t
t
t
t
s
t c
c
Ξ
k
ds &τ . Therefore, 
,t
t
t
,t
t
t
,t
t
t
,t
t
t k
τ
k
τ
k
τ
k
τ
2211
limlimlimlim ∂
∂==∂
∂= ∞→∞→∞→∞→  and 
,t
t
s
t
,t
t
s
t
,t
t
s
t
,t
t
s
t k
dsτ
k
dsτ
k
dsτ
k
dsτ
2
0
2
0
1
0
1
0 limlimlimlim ∂
∂
==∂
∂
= ∫∫∫∫ ∞→∞→∞→∞→ , and thus, 
( ) 0lim1lim
1
1
1
1
111
0
1
0 <−=
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂−−
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
∂
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛∂
−
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
∞→
−
∞→
∫∫
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
,t
t
,t
t
,t
t
s
,t
t
sα
α
t k
c
k
c
k
τ
k
τ
k
dsτ
k
dsτ
δα
mν
α , and 
( ) 0lim1lim
2
2
2
2
222
0
2
0 <−=
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂−−
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
∂
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛∂
−
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛− ∞→
−
∞→
∫∫
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
,t
t
,t
t
,t
t
s
,t
t
sα
α
t k
c
k
c
k
τ
k
τ
k
dsτ
k
dsτ
δα
mν
α . Hence, 
by Lemma 1, the transversality conditions (equations (11) and (15)) are satisfied while 
all the other optimality conditions are satisfied. 
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 On the other hand, if 
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t c
c
c
c
2
2
1
1 limlim
&&
∞→∞→ ≠ , then ∫
∫ ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛
≠ ∞→∞→ t
s
t
s
t
t
t
t ds
dt
dsd
0
0
limlim τ
τ
τ
τ& . Thus by 
Lemma 1, for both countries to satisfy the transverality conditions, it is necessary that 
∞=∞→
,t
,t
t k
c
1
1lim  or ∞=∞→
,t
,t
t k
c
2
2lim
& , which violates equations (10) or (14). As a result, if and 
only if == ∞→∞→
t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1 limlim
&& constant, all the optimality conditions are satisfied at the 
steady state.                                                           ■ 
 
 By Lemmas, it is proved that, if all the optimality conditions are satisfied, both 
countries grow on the following balanced growth path while satisfying all the optimality 
conditions. 
 
Proposition 1: If and only if == ∞→∞→
t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1 limlim
&& constant, then 
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t k
k
c
c
c
c
1
1
2
2
1
1 limlimlim
&&&
∞→∞→∞→ ==  
==== ∞→∞→∞→∞→
t
t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t A
A
y
y
y
y
k
k &&&&
limlimlimlim
2
2
1
1
2
2 constant. 
Proof: As for ,ty1 , because αtαtt kAy −= 1,1,1 , ( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= t
t
,t
,t
α
,t
t
,t AA
k
αkα
k
Ay &&& 11
1
1 1 . Because 
( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( ) ,t,t
,t,t
t kαmν
α
kfmν
kfkfα
A 1
1
21
1−=′
+=  and thus because ( ) ,tt kαmν
αA 11
&&
−= , then =,ty1&  
( ) ( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−+−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
t
,t
α
,t
t
,t A
k
αmν
α
α
k
Ak 1
2
1
1 1
1& , and thus ( ) ( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−+−= t
,t
,t
,t
,t
,t
A
k
αmν
α
α
k
k
y
y 12
1
1
1
1
1
1
&& . Because 
( ) ,tt kαmν
αA 11−= , ( )[ ] ,t
,t
,t
,t
,t
,t
k
k
αα
k
k
y
y
1
1
1
1
1
1 1
&&& =+−= . Hence, by Lemma 2, == ∞→∞→
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t c
c
y
y
1
1
1
1 limlim
&&  
,t
,t
t k
k
1
1lim
&
∞→
. Because tt yy ,2,1 = , then 
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t k
k
k
k
c
c
c
c
y
y
y
y
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
1 limlimlimlimlimlim
&&&&&&
∞→∞→∞→∞→∞→∞→ ===== . 
 As for tA , by ( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= t
t
,t
,t
α
,t
t
,t AA
k
αkα
k
Ay &&& 11
1
1 1  and ( ) ,tt kαmν
αA 11
&&
−= , =,ty1& !
( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
t
,t
α
,t
t
t A
k
α
α
αmν
k
AA 1
2
1
1&  and thus ( )
t
t
,t
t
,t
,t
A
A
α
α
αmν
k
A
y
y &&& +−=
2
11
1 1 . Because ( ) ,tt kαmν
αA 11
&&
−= , 
then ( )
t
t
,t
,t
,t
,t
A
A
α
k
k
α
y
y &&& +−=
1
1
1
1 1 . Hence, ( )
t
t
,t
,t
,t
,t
,t
,t
A
A
α
k
k
α
k
k
y
y &&&& +−==
1
1
1
1
1
1 1  and thus 
t
t
,t
,t
A
A
k
k && =
1
1 . 
Because tt kk ,2,1 = , then 
t
t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t A
A
y
y
y
y
k
k
k
k
c
c
c
c &&&&&&&
∞→∞→∞→∞→∞→∞→∞→
====== limlimlimlimlimlimlim
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
1 .  ■ 
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Corollary 1: If and only if == ∞→∞→
t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1 limlim
&& constant, then == ∫
∫
∞→∞→ t
s
t
s
t
t
t
t dsτ
dt
dsτd
τ
τ
0
0
limlim
&  
======= ∞→∞→∞→∞→∞→∞→∞→
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t A
A
y
y
y
y
k
k
k
k
c
c
c
c &&&&&&&
limlimlimlimlimlimlim
,2
,2
,1
,1
,2
,2
,1
,1
,2
,2
,1
,1 a positive constant. 
Proof: By Lemma 2, 
ds
dt
dsd
c
c
c
c
t
s
t
s
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t ∫
∫
∞→∞→∞→∞→ ===
0
0
,2
,2
,1
,1 limlimlimlim
τ
τ
τ
τ&&& . Hence, by Proposition 
1, ========= ∞→∞→∞→∞→∞→∞→∞→∞→∞→ ∫
∫
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
tt
s
t
s
t
t
t
t A
A
y
y
y
y
k
k
k
k
c
c
c
c
dsτ
dt
dsτd
τ
τ &&&&&&&& limlimlimlimlimlimlimlimlim
,2
,2
,1
,1
,2
,2
,1
,1
,2
,2
,1
,1
0
0
a 
positive constant.                                                      ■ 
 
Because eventually current account imbalances grow at the same rate with output, 
consumption and capital, then the ratio of the balance on current account to output do 
not explode but stabilizes as shown in the proof of Lemma 3, i.e., Ξ
k
τ
k
τ
t
t
t
t
t
t
== ∞→∞→
,2,1
limlim . 
 Because technology will not decrease persistently, i.e., 0lim >∞→
t
t
t A
A& , then only 
the case such that === ∞→∞→∞→
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t k
k
c
c
c
c
1
1
2
2
1
1 limlimlim
&&&
0limlimlimlim
2
2
1
1
2
2 >=== ∞→∞→∞→∞→
t
t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t A
A
y
y
y
y
k
k &&&&  is 
examined hereafter in this paper. 
 
4.  THREE STRATEGIES 
 
 The strategy of trade liberalization for a relatively more impatient country is 
examined in the following sections based on the model shown in Section 3. 
 
4.1  The strategy of free trade 
      Although the balanced growth path shown in Proposition 1 satisfies all the 
optimality conditions, the representative households in both countries may not 
necessarily behave consistently with the balanced growth path because they are 
heterogeneous. Becker (1980) shows that if households have heterogeneous rates of 
time preference, the most patient household owns all wealth if households are purely 
price takers. Ghiglino (2002) predicts that it is likely that under appropriate assumptions 
the results in Becker (1980) still hold in endogenous growth models. Farmer and Lahiri 
(2004) show that in general, balanced growth equilibria do not exist in a multi-agent 
economy except for the special case that all agents have the same constant rate of time 
preference. This argument may still hold in the model in this paper.  
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Lemma 4: If the representative household in each country sets tτ  without regarding 
the other country’s optimality conditions, then it is not possible that all the optimality 
conditions of both countries are satisfied. 
Proof: In this case, tτ  can be seen as a control variable for each country. Hence, the 
same optimality condition ( ) 11 01 =∂
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛∂
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ∫−
t
t
s
α
α
τ
dsτ
δα
mν
α  is added to the optimality 
conditions of each of the two countries. Here, by Lemma 3, if all the optimality 
conditions are satisfied, then Ξ
k
τ
k
τ
t
t
t
t
t
t
== ∞→∞→
,2,1
limlim  and  == ∫∫ ∞→∞→
t
t
s
t
t
t
s
t k
ds
k
ds
,2
0
,1
0 limlim
ττ
 
1
,1
,1lim
−
∞→ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
t
t
t c
c
Ξ
&  where Ξ is a constant. By condition ( ) 11 01 =∂
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛∂
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ∫−
t
t
s
α
α
τ
dsτ
δα
mν
α ,  
( )
t
t
t
α
α
c
c
δα
mν
α
,1
,11 lim1
&
∞→
− =−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ . Hence, ( ) =
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
∂
∂−∂
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛∂
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ∫−
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t
t
t
t
s
α
α
t k
τ
k
dsτ
δα
mν
α
,1,1
011lim  
0limlim
1
1
1
1
1 =−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
∞→∞→ Ξc
c
Ξ
c
c
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t
&& . Therefore, ( )
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= −−
∞→ 1
1
,1
,1 1lim θδα
mν
α
ε
c
c α
α
t
t
t
&  and 
( )
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= −−
∞→ 2
1
,2
,2 1lim θδα
mν
α
ε
c
c α
α
t
t
t
& . Thereby 
t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1 limlim
&&
∞→∞→ > , which contradicts 
the conditions == ∞→∞→
t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1 limlim
&& constant shown in Lemma 3.                   ■ 
 
The proof of Lemma 4 indicates that country 1 can satisfy all its optimality conditions 
only if either 
t
t
tt
s
t
s
t
t
t
t c
c
ds
dt
dsd
,1
,1
0
0
limlimlim
&&
∞→∞→∞→ =
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
= ∫
∫
τ
τ
τ
τ  or 
∫
∫ ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛
= ∞→∞→ t
s
t
s
t
t
t
t ds
dt
dsd
0
0
limlim τ
τ
τ
τ&  
( ) δα
mν
α α
α
−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= −11  because 
t
t
t c
c
,1
,1lim
&
∞→
 can be constant only in both cases. The former 
case corresponds to the case Proposition 1 shows (hereafter called a “multilateral 
balanced growth path”), and both countries can satisfy all the optimality conditions. On 
the other hand, in the latter case, although all the optimality conditions are satisfied in 
country 1, they cannot in country 2 (hereafter called a “unilateral balanced growth 
path”). In this case, 
∫
∫ ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛
=≠ ∞→∞→∞→ t
s
t
s
t
t
t
t
t
t
t ds
dt
dsd
c
c
0
0
,1
,1 limlimlim τ
τ
τ
τ&&  and 
t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1 limlim
&&
∞→∞→ > . Here, by 
 15
equations (6) and (7), =⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −∂
∂=− ∫ tt s
,t
,t
,t,t τdsτk
y
cc
0
1
1
21 2 ( ) ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ∫− tt sα
α
τdsτα
mν
α
0
112 , and 
thus a unilateral balanced growth path requires ( ) 0lim 21 =−∞→ ,t,tt cc  because =∫∞→ t s
t
t ds
0
lim τ
τ  
( ) δα
mν
α α
α
−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −11 . However, because 
t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1 limlim
&&
∞→∞→ > , then country 2 must initially 
sets consumption such that ∞=02 ,c  that violates the optimality condition of country 2. 
Therefore, unlike multilateral balanced growth path, country 2 cannot satisfy all its 
optimal conditions even though country 1 can. 
 How should country 2 respond to the unilateral balanced growth path of 
country 1? Possibly, both countries negotiate for the trade between them, and some 
agreements may be reached. Nevertheless, if no agreement is reached and country 1 
never regards the country 2’s optimality conditions, country 2, in general, will fall into 
the following uncomfortable situation.  
 
Remark 1: If the representative household in country 1 does not regard the country 2’s 
optimality conditions, all capitals in country 2 will be eventually owned by country 1.  
 
The reason for Remark 1 is as follows. Suppose first that country 1 chooses the 
unilateral balanced growth path and sets c1,0 so as to achieve this path. There are two 
options for country 2. The first option is that country 2 also pursues its own optimality 
without regarding country 1, i.e., chooses its own unilateral balanced growth path. The 
second option is to adapt to the behavior of country 1 as a follower. If country 2 takes 
the first option, it sets c2,0 without regarding c1,0 like country 1. As Lemma 4 indicates, 
unilaterally optimal growth rates are different between the two countries and 
t
t
t
t
c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1 && > , 
and thus initial consumptions are set as 0,20,1 cc < . Because ( ) ( )
t
,t,t
,t
,t
A
yy
mν
k
y
∂
+∂=∂
∂ − 211
1
1 2  
,t
,t
k
y
2
2
∂
∂=  and tt kk ,2,1 =  must be kept, capitals and technology are equal and grow at the 
same rate in both countries. Hence, because 0,20,1 cc < , more capitals are initially 
produced in country 1 than country 2 and thus some of them need be exported to 
country 2. As a result, 
t
t
,t
,t
,t
,t
t
t
c
c
k
k
k
k
c
c
,2
,2
2
2
1
1
,1
,1 &&&& >=> , which means that each of both countries 
equally cannot satisfy all its own optimality conditions. Because 
,t
,t
t
t
t
t k
k
c
c
1
1
,1
,1 limlim
&&
∞→∞→
>  
t
t
t
,t
,t
t c
c
k
k
,2
,2
2
2 limlim
&&
∞→∞→ >= , capital soon becomes abundant in country 2, and thus unutilized 
goods and services are produced in country 2. These unutilized products are exported to 
and utilized in country 1. This process escalates as time passes because >∞→
t
t
t c
c
,1
,1lim
&  
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t
t
t
,t
,t
t
,t
,t
t c
c
k
k
k
k
,2
,2
2
2
1
1 limlimlim
&&&
∞→∞→∞→
>=  and eventually almost all of consumer goods and services 
produced in country 2 are consumed by the household in country 1. This consequence 
will be uncomfortable for country 2. 
 Next, if country 2 takes the second option, country 2 should set ∞=02 ,c  to 
satisfy all its optimality conditions as Lemma 4 shows. Setting ∞=02 ,c  is impossible, 
but country 2 as a follower will initially set as large ,tc2  as possible. This action gives 
country 2 the higher expected utility than that when taking the first option because 
consumption of country 2 in this case is always higher than that when taking the first 
option. As a result, country 2 imports as large goods and services as possible from 
country 1, and the trade deficit of country 2 pile up until ( ) tt sα
α
τdsτα
mν
α =−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ∫− 011  is 
achieved, i.e., until 
∫
∫ ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛
= t
s
t
s
t
t
ds
dt
dsd
0
0
τ
τ
τ
τ&  is achieved. In other words, the trade balance of 
country 2 never becomes surpluses. The current account deficits and the accumulated 
debts of country 2 to country 1 continue to increase indefinitely. Furthermore, it 
increases more rapidly than the growth rate of outputs (
t
t
t y
y
,2
,2lim
&
∞→
) because in general 
t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
τ
τ&&
∞→∞→ < limlim
,1
,1 , i.e., ( ) ( ) ( )21111 θθδαmν
α
ε α
α
<<
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛− − . Then, soon, all capitals in 
country 2 are owned by country 1.3 This consequence will be also uncomfortable for 
country 2. 
 As a result, country 2 cannot satisfy all its optimality conditions in any case if 
country 1 takes a unilateral balanced growth path, and both options to counter the 
unilateral action of country 1 are uncomfortable for country 2. However, the expected 
utility of country 2 is higher if it takes the second option than the first option. Hence, 
under the circumstance that country 2 cannot satisfy all its optimality conditions in any 
case, country 2 will choose the second option because of the higher expected utility. 
Thus, if country 1 does not regard country 2’s optimality conditions, all capitals in 
country 2 will be eventually owned by country 1. This result corresponds to the 
consequence in an economy with households that have heterogeneous rates of time 
preference shown in Becker (1980). As a result, the consequences of the strategy of 
adopting free trade suggest that this strategy is not necessarily favorable for more 
impatient country 2, and thus country 2 may search for an alternative more comfortable 
strategy.  
 
4.2  The strategy of trade protection 
                                                          
3 Note that even though the households in country 2 possess no capital, the capital stock in country 2 is 
still kept to be tt kk ,1,2 =  and thus tt yy ,1,2 = . Point is that all the capital in country 2 is owned by 
foreigners. 
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 To avoid the uncomfortable strategy of free trade, country 2 may take the 
strategy of trade protection. If this strategy is taken, the model has to be modified to 
exclude the variable tτ . In addition, the returns on investing in Ai,t need to be modified 
to ( )
ti
ti
A
y
m ν
,
,1
∂
∂− . If both countries are open, the relation 
t
ρ
t
L
Mm =  is held for the 
combined numbers of population and firms, but if a country is isolated, this relation is 
completed within its economy, and thus 
1
, 2
−
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= tρti LMm  is held in each of both 
countries. Hence, ( )titi
ρ
ti
ti
ti
νA
Y
M
K
Y
,
,
,
,
,
∂
∂=∂
∂ −  and ( )
ti
tit
ti
tit
ti
ti
A
y
mνL
νA
yLm
k
y
,
,1
,
,
1
,
,
22 ∂
∂=∂
∂⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=∂
∂ −− . 
The optimization problem of the representative household in country i (i = 1, 2 ) is; 
 
( ) ( )dttθcuEMax itii −∫ ∞ exp0 ,0 , 
 
subject to 
 
ti
t
titititi δk
LAνcyk ,
1
,,,, 2
−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−−=
−
&& , 
 
Because ( ) i,ti,tα
α
i,t ckδαmν
αk −
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= −1& , then ( )
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= −− iα
α
i,t
i,t θδα
mν
α
ε
c
c
11
& , and 
the balanced growth path in each country is 
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
ti
A
A
y
y
k
k
c
c
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
&&&& === . 
 Because 21 θθ < , then 
,t
,t
,t
,t
c
c
c
c
2
2
1
1 && > . Hence, although country 2 can satisfy all its 
optimality conditions, its growth rate is always lower than country 1 and thus its outputs 
become far smaller than country 1. This consequence of the trade protection strategy 
will be also not favorable for country 2. 
 
4.3  The strategy of free trade with wielding market power 
 Both strategies (free trade and trade protection) are uncomfortable for country 
2. Nevertheless, this does not mean that country 2 has no escape because the isolation of 
country 2 is also not comfortable for country 1 and thus country 1 may change its 
behavior if country 2 shows its intention to isolate itself. The isolation of country 2 
indicates that country 1 must allocate more resources for the generation of technology, 
and as a result, consumption and the expected utility of the representative household in 
country 1 will decline by the isolation of country 2. Hence, country 1 may compromise 
to cooperate with country 2. Sorger (2002) shows that if a government levies a 
progressive income tax, or if there are few households of each type and thus they are not 
simple price takers but play a Nash equilibrium, the results shown in Becker (1980) do 
not hold anymore. Ghiglino (2002) argues that the latter case in Sorger (2002) can be 
interpreted as a model of international trade with a common market simply by 
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associating each household’s type to a country with a national central planner or a 
representative household.  
 The above arguments suggest that it is not unnatural that the representative 
households in both countries play a Nash equilibrium with regard to the sequence of tτ . 
As Sorger (2002) argues, if a household in a country behaves as a member of a large 
group of households and know demand functions in markets, the households in the 
country can wield market power. Therefore, if a relatively more impatient country is 
large enough, it may be possible to wield market power against the less impatient 
country. Lemma 3 shows that if and only if == ∞→∞→
t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1 limlim
&& constant, all the 
optimality conditions in both countries are satisfied. Therefore, if the representative 
households in both countries behave so as to satisfy == ∞→∞→
t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1 limlim
&& constant at the 
Nash equilibrium, the growth path shown in Proposition 1, i.e., the multilateral balanced 
growth path, is achieved. Both countries can satisfy all the optimality conditions 
simultaneously.  
 As shown in the proof of Lemma 3, Ξ
k
τ
k
τ
t
t
t
t
t
t
== ∞→∞→
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limlim  and =∫∞→
t
t
s
t k
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t
t
t
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k
ds &τ  on the multilateral balanced growth path, and because ki,t is 
positive, if the sign of Ξ is negative, the current account of economy 1 shows deficits 
eventually and permanently and vice versa. On the multilateral balanced growth path, 
the value of Ξ is uniquely determined as follows. 
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Therefore, the value of Ξ is uniquely determined. In addition, the sign of Ξ is uniquely 
determined by the relative difference of the rate of time preference between country 1 
and 2 as follows.  
 
Proposition 2: If ( ) ( )
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Proof: ( ) 01lim
11
01 <
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
∂
∂−∂
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛∂
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ∫−
∞→
,t
t
,t
t
s
α
α
t k
τ
k
dsτ
δα
mν
α  for 
t
t
t
t
t
t c
c
c
c
,2
,2
,1
,1 limlim
&&
∞→∞→
=  by equations (16) 
and (17), and ( ) ( ) Ξ
c
c
Ξδα
mν
α
k
τ
k
dsτ
δα
mν
α
,t
,t
t
α
α
,t
t
,t
t
s
α
α
t
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
∂
∂−∂
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛∂
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −
∞→
−−
∞→
∫ 1
1
11
11
01 lim11lim
&  
( ) 01lim1
1
1
11 <
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=
−
∞→
−
,t
,t
t
α
α
c
c
δα
mν
α
Ξ
& . Because ( )
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ +−−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= −−∞→ 21lim
211
2
2 θθδα
mν
α
ε
c
c α
α
,t
,t
t
&  
as shown in the proof of Lemma 5, then ( ) =−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −
∞→
− 1lim1
1
1
11
,t
,t
t
α
α
c
c
δα
mν
α &  
( )
( )
1
2
1
1
21
1
−+−−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−
−
θθ
δα
mν
α
δα
mν
α
ε
α
α
α
α
. Thus, if ( ) ( )
2
11 211 θθδα
mν
α
εδα
mν
α α
α
α
α +<
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−−−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−  , 
then ( ) 1lim10
1
1
11 −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛<
−
∞→
−
,t
,t
t
α
α
c
c
δα
mν
α &  and thus 0<Ξ .                   ■ 
 
Proposition 2 indicates the permanent current account deficits in less impatient country 
1. The condition ( ) ( )
2
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for reasonable parameter values.  
 On the other hand, the opposite is true for the trade balance. 
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That is, the trade surpluses of country 1 continue indefinitely and vice versa. 
Proof: The balance on goods and services in country 1 is .lim
0
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& . As shown in the proof of Proposition 2, if 
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Corollary 2 indicates the permanent trade surpluses in less impatient country 1. That is, 
goods and services are transferred from country 1 to country 2 in each period 
indefinitely in exchange for the return to the accumulated current account deficits in 
country 1.  
 Nevertheless, the trade balance of country 1 is not surplus from the beginning. 
Before Corollary 1 is satisfied, negative dsτ
t
s∫0  should be piled up. In the early periods 
with the small amount of dsτ
t
s∫0 , the balance on goods and services in country 1 
dsτδ
k
y
τ
t
s
t
t
t ∫⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −∂
∂−
0
,2
,2  continues to be negative. That is, country 1 experiences continuous 
trade deficits for the time being, and after negative dsτ
t
s∫0  piles up sufficiently, the 
trade balance of country 1 changes to be surpluses. 
 
5.  DISCUSSION 
 
5.1  The comparison of strategies 
 The summary of the three strategies for more impatient country 2 is as follows.  
 
  1) The optimality conditions  
     - The strategy of free trade without wielding market power 
        Not satisfied 
     - The strategy of trade protection 
        Satisfied 
     - The strategy of free trade with wielding market power 
        Satisfied 
 
 2) Outputs 
     - The strategy of free trade without wielding market power 
        tt yy ,1,2 =  
     - The strategy of trade protection 
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        tt yy ,1,2 <  
     - The strategy of free trade with wielding market power 
        tt yy 12 =  
 
  3) The long-run growth rate of output 
     - The strategy of free trade without wielding market power 
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     - The strategy of free trade with wielding market power 
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  4) The balance on current account 
     - The strategy of free trade without wielding market power 
       Deficits 
     - The strategy of trade protection 
       No trade 
     - The strategy of free trade with wielding market power 
       Surpluses 
 
  5) The ownership of capitals 
     - The strategy of free trade without wielding market power 
       No 
     - The strategy of trade protection 
       All 
     - The strategy of free trade with wielding market power 
       All 
 
5.2  The best strategy 
5.2.1  The best strategy for country 2 that is large enough and can 
wield market power. 
 If country 2 is large enough and can wield market power, country 2 can choose 
the strategy that satisfies all its optimality conditions, i.e., the strategy of free trade with 
wielding market power. In this sense, the strategy of free trade with wielding market 
power is preferable for country 2. Nevertheless, although the optimality conditions are 
not satisfied, the strategy of free trade without wielding market power shows the highest 
long-run growth rate and thus the highest long-run level of output and consumption. 
From this point of view, country 2 may choose the strategy of free trade without 
wielding market power. However, this choice indicates that households in country 2 do 
not care about optimality, i.e., they are irrational. If households are rational, they will 
give priority to its satisfying optimality conditions even though the growth rate is low to 
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some extent. Even if choosing the strategy of free trade with wielding market power, the 
growth rates of country 1 and 2 are equal, which implies that country 2 will not be so 
uncomfortable for choosing this strategy. As a whole, if country 2 is large enough and if 
the households in country 2 behave rationally, the best strategy will be the strategy of 
free trade with wielding market power.  
 This conclusion provides insights into the recent trade behavior of China whose 
economy is clearly large enough to wield market power. The large bilateral current 
account deficit of the U.S. with China has been persisting and is a big political issue 
between the U.S. and China. The reason why the large bilateral current account deficit 
of the U.S. with China has been persisting has been debated actively and many 
economists argue that the problem is China's currency manipulation. Probably China’s 
currency manipulation has truly distorted markets significantly and may explain a large 
part of the deficit of the .U.S. with China, but some other ingredients may also have 
influence to some extent. The model in the paper indicates that if the rate of time 
preference in China is higher compared with the U.S. and if China is wielding market 
power, the balance on current account in China shows surpluses permanently as a result 
of rational behavior in both countries.  
 
5.2.2  The best strategy for country 2 that is not large enough and can 
not wield market power. 
 If country 2 is not large enough and cannot wield market power, country 2 has 
only two options: the strategy of trade protection and the strategy of free trade without 
wielding market power. The former strategy satisfies all its optimality conditions, but 
the latter strategy provides the much higher growth rate. If households are rational, they 
will give priority to the former strategy. Nevertheless, protecting trade results in the 
permanently lower growth rate and thus far lower consumption level compared with 
country 1. The gap of outputs between both countries widens exponentially forever.  
 One way to evaluate which is the best strategy is to simply compare the 
expected utility when choosing each of the strategies. Nevertheless, unless country 2 has 
the very high rate of time preference, it is not easy to say which strategy provides the 
higher expected utility. As a whole, this problem ― which strategy is the best ― may 
not be solved purely from the economic point of view. It may be solved from the 
political point of view, e.g., the national economic security or the pride of the nation 
that may be hurt by “economical occupation” by foreigners, although it is a very hard 
choice. 
 Nevertheless, there is a chance to evade the hard choice. If many small 
countries with similar preferences cooperate with each other and integrate their 
economies, they can wield a combined market power. If their market power is strong 
enough like a large country, they can choose the strategy of free trade with wielding 
market power. As a result, they can satisfy all their optimality conditions. Therefore, 
integrating economies by regional Free Trade Agreements among small countries may 
be a way to obtain their optimal situation.  
 
6.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 This paper studies the impact of trade liberalization in a country with the 
 23
relatively higher rate of time preference in the framework of endogenous growth. Based 
on a two-country endogenous growth model, the strategy for a relatively more impatient 
country to deal with trade liberalization is examined. The results are summed up as 
follows: (1) when a relatively more impatient country is large enough and can wield 
market power, its best strategy is the strategy of free trade with wielding market power 
because only by this strategy, all the optimality conditions can be satisfied, (2) when a 
relatively more impatient country is not large enough and can not wield market power, 
it is very difficult to say which strategy is the best. Nevertheless, if many small 
countries with similar preferences cooperate with each other and integrate their 
economies, they can choose the strategy of free trade with wielding market power like a 
large country. 
 The strategy of free trade with wielding market power provides insights into 
the recent trade behavior of China whose economy is large enough to wield market 
power. The large bilateral current account deficit of the U.S. with China has been 
persisting. The model in this paper predicts that the current account deficit of the U.S. 
with China will be observed if the rate of time preference in China is relatively higher 
than that in the U.S. and if China is wielding market power. The trade imbalance may 
be mainly caused by China’s currency manipulation as many economists argue, but, 
considering the importance of this issue, the mechanism of trade imbalances shown in 
this paper should also be studied.  
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